- deauth/kick: use full PINEAPPLE_DEAUTH_CLIENT hak5cmd app name (BUG 1)
- _allow_all_ssids: PINEAPPLE_NETWORK_FILTER_MODE deny so karma lets
clients associate after deploy (BUG 2)
- enterprise inner EAP (BUG 3), two root causes found by live experiment:
- hostapd never wildcard-matches a bare `*` identity for phase-2
lookups; eap_users now uses quoted empty prefix `""* ... [2]`,
which prefix-matches any inner identity
- pineape_auth_pass=1 forwards inner EAP to pineapd, which has no
standalone responder; deploy forces 0 and stop restores 1
Residual: plaintext MSCHAPv2 capture is firmware-blocked on 24.10.1
(MSG_DEBUG compiled out of the karma wpad; `-f` silently ignored);
documented in code comments and the validation report.
- ISSUE 4: point pineapd.@hostapd[0].mgmtiface at wlan1wpa during 5 GHz
WPA deploys so handshakes/loot populate; cleared on stop
- ISSUE 5: radio0 set_ap path polls 90 s across the wifi-reload window
and retries set_ap once if the iface still has not appeared
- ISSUE 6: skills docs use `llc && eth.type == 0x888e` (firmware tcpdump
matches 0 frames on `eapol`)
- ISSUE 7: capture state helper detects dead-pid / iface-down, cleans up,
status reports {running:false, stale:true} instead of zombie running
- tests: fix global os.path monkeypatch leaks between test modules that
broke test_mk8_events/test_reliability_api under discovery; add
regression coverage for all fixes above (463 tests green)
Live validation evidence and newly discovered firmware quirks
(DEVICE_FILTER_DELETE no-op, dropbear rate limiting) recorded in
docs/validation/2026-08-23-pineap-validation-report.md.
Retry and serialize pineapd/hak5 calls, queue virtual-pager keys, and grey out buttons until the pager finishes. Deploy now installs python3-light after factory firmware. Bump version to 1.3.2.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
pineapple-control gains the uplink-pins-phy0 constraint, the five-part
pineapd crash stack, and the standalone PineAPE engine recipe; wifi-deauth
gains the field-verified passive-capture finding (clients that refuse the
evil twin still produce crackable 4-ways of the real AP, [B,1,2,3,4]).
Evil WPA playbook hint mentions the passive fallback. Skills are served to
agents via MCP resources.
Streamable-HTTP MCP server on POST /mcp: device.state, attack.deploy/stop/
status/deauth/capture/export_hc22000, loot.handshakes/enterprise_creds,
recon.aps/isearch/devices, pineap.kick_client/set_filter tools; recon DB +
bundled opencode skills resources; attack playbook prompts. Cookie or Bearer
auth. Harness page shows endpoint, token, curl snippet, capability explorer
and a copy-paste pi.dev prompt. scripts/harness_stdio.py for stdio-only
agents.
c4ch3c4d3
bzuccaroandCursor