The attack targeted at least one organization in Saudi Arabia, which aligns with the targeting of the initial Shamoon attacks. It appears the purpose of the new Disttrack samples were solely focused on destruction, as the samples were configured with a non-operational C2 server to report to and were set to begin wiping data exactly on 2016/11/17 20:45. Disttrack uses the internal domain names and credentials to log into remote systems on the same network segment. The dropper then attempts to open the service manager on each remote system to start the RemoteRegistry service, which it will connect to using RegConnectRegistryW. The dropper then checks to see if it has administrator privileges on the remote system by attempting to open "\system32\csrss.exe", which allows it to determine if it can write its payload to the "\system32" folder on the remote system. Scheduled tasks require a time in which the task will run, which the dropper determines by calling the function NetRemoteTOD to obtain the time of day from the remote system. While completely speculative, the word “shinu” used as a parameter could be a reference to the Arabic slang for the word “what”, as well as a reference to a village name in northwestern Iran. It appears that the “drdisk.sys” driver (SHA256: 4744df6ac02ff0a3f9ad0bf47b15854bbebb73c936dd02f7c79293a2828406f6) is the exact same driver as used in the Shamoon attack in 2012. During this activity, we noticed the wiper changing the system time to August 2012, as the temporary license key for the RawDisk driver requires the system time to not exceed the month of August, which is when the temporary license would expire. The current attack campaign has several TTP overlaps with the original Shamoon campaign, especially from a targeting and timing perspective